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Abstract
The word ‘Taliban’ has become synonymous with terrorism in wake of the terrorist attacks on
September 11. This study challenges the genealogies behind the word and how it has transformed
itself and its meaning in discourse. The past and present usage of the term will be analyzed in the
context of the local Afghan political economy and the effects and purpose of US military
intervention. The origins of the term will be traced to the destruction of the Afghan economy after
the defeat of the Soviets. The study will further try to understand the security failures of the Afghan
state during the contemporary period of US military intervention and how such failures have
contributed to a remobilization of the Taliban as a group of diverse political movements while goals
relate to their particular historical, geographical, economic and strategic position with the context of
different Afghanistan villages and provinces.
The analytical framework of this study will be the local political economy of the Afghan village.
Village cultures have helped to shape the historical and contemporary political orientation of the
Taliban. Gramsci’s theory of ‘cultural hegemony’ will be employed to examine the growth of the
Taliban in the context of the economic collapse of villages, which the Taliban has used to strengthen
its position within Afghan village communities. Gramsci’s theory is also useful for examining and
critiquing the hegemonic and cultural biases of the US occupying army. The escalation of the US
backed war in Afghanistan has coincided with a return of the Taliban to positions of influence and
power, largely by intensifying the destruction and threats to many of the fragile security networks
that exist within the Afghan village. The study will conclude with formal analysis and projection of
the future of Afghanistan and how US foreign policy will influence the region in whole.

Chapter I. Genealogies of the word ‘Taliban’
The origins of the Taliban, an extremist religious fundamentalist group that took political
power in Afghanistan by 1996 and now battles US and NATO military forces, should be located in
the historical circumstances that gave rise to the group during the 1980s. These circumstances
include the disintegration of the Afghanistan village, in particular the rural economy and localized
political structures that had historically provided political stability in the country. In addition, the
invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union and the large-scale mobilization by the US and the
Pakistani governments of religious extremists contributed to the creation of the Taliban. The wartime conditions and invasions of Afghanistan territory by foreign powers fueled the growth of
religious zealotry epitomized by the Taliban, which then filled a vacuum of economic, political, and
ideological space within Afghanistan.

A vacuum within this context can be described as the

destruction of physical space, which limits or eliminates the basic access to the necessities of life.
This is further complicated by the occupying foreign forces that further destabilize the local Afghan
village economy due to the importance given by the occupying powers to the centralization of
governmental authority. The subsequent disintegration of the balance between rural and urban
economies has had an adverse effect on the country as a whole, consequently creating an
environment for radical ideologies to emerge. Through explaining the genealogies of ‘Taliban;’ this
study seeks to locate the political and ideological tendencies of the Taliban movement within a larger
context of power relationships within Afghanistan. This includes an examination of the historical
and contemporary impact of foreign intervention on the Taliban, from the period of the 1980s to
the present.

‘Taliban’ (tālibān) is often used incorrectly in various publications throughout the Occident as
a singular noun which convolutes its meaning and direction severely. 1 On the contrary ‘Taliban’ is
borrowed from the original word ‘Talib’ (tālib) which is Arabic and singular for ‘student seeking
religious scholarship.’ 2 Thus, ‘Taliban’ is the plural for ‘Talib’ that has evolved within the Afghan
languages of Dari and Pashto. In Urdu, which is the one of the dominant languages of Pakistan,
‘Talib’ is referred to as talib-e-ilm (student seeking of knowledge). 3 In Afghanistan the word is
associated with religious scholarship of students in ‘deeni madrassa’ (religious institution) and thus
highlights divide between standard and religious schooling within the society. The movement of
Taliban is based upon madrassas that were opened during the Afghan-Soviet war. Before the war,
Pakistan only had 900 madrassas throughout the country, but under General Zia-ul-Haq’s tenure the
number grew to 8,000 registered and 25,000 unregistered with over half a million students enrolled. 4
The high enrollment of the students mainly from poor families was due to the collapse of Pakistan’s
state-run educational system. 5 These madrassas followed the Deobandi School (Hanafi) which is
conservative, but tolerant of the diversity within Islam. 6 This movement gained more ground once
the Pakistan Army and its Intelligence agency (ISI) realized the potential for usage to indoctrinate an
Islamic front against Soviets and communists. The agenda of these madrassas was simple; educate
the mujahedeen, their children, and foreign fighters through radical ideology and support the
government’s stance against communists. There was a rift between two major Islamist parties within
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Pakistan that later joined forces to form a united political front. The two parties were: Jamaat-eIslami (JI) led by Qazi Hussain Ahmed and Jamaat-e-Ulema-e-Islami (JUI) led by Maulana Fazl-urRehman. 7
Historical understanding of how the fundamental religious schools came about is imperative
in comprehending the development of the Taliban movement). The United States funded many of
the religious institutions along the Pak-Afghan border through Pakistan’s elite intelligence agency,
the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), during the Soviet invasion. 8 The goal was to bring together
various Afghan tribes and Pakistani religious groups to form a united front. 9 In this scenario the
Pakistanis provided the teachers and the Mujahedeen provided the students (talib-e-ilms). The
United States expanded this support to include Jihadi textbooks and curriculum that came from the
University of Nebraska-Omaha, which received aid grants from the government. 10 This support
went into the mid 1990’s with a sizable budget of $51 million (University of Nebraska-Omaha) as
United States felt it was important to keep the radical elements thriving within the region. 11 The
extended aid from the US to the Mujahedeen was due to the direct Soviet involvement with the
Najibullah government. The aid included weapons and cash at an estimate of 3-4 billion dollars a
year until the end of 1991. 12 Soviets did not want Afghanistan to sway away from their influence and
the US wanted to continue its fight against the communists. The essence of control through
ideological consensus filled one basic role for the United States foreign policy; no communist
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leadership could thrive in Afghanistan in the immediate future. The United States did not want
Najibullah to be the President of Afghanistan as he was deemed a communist due to his affiliation
with PDPA (People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan). After the US had left Afghanistan it was
Pakistan who was left alone to deal with the Mujahedeen and extremist elements. Pakistan wanted to
solve the Durand Line issue with Afghanistan and it needed a favorable government in place to
achieve this goal.

13

Pakistan also wanted to be a regional power and to project influence over

Afghanistan to keep its focus on India as the enemy state. The madrassas (religious institutions) did
not train or arm the students, but encouraged mobilization to join the ‘Jihad’ (Holy War) against the
communists. 14 This technique of mass mobilization could be the characteristic feature for the
Taliban movement that came to play an instrumental role in their success both militarily and
ideologically in the years to come.
The roots of ‘Taliban’ can also be traced to neighboring Pakistan which saw itself go through
an ‘Islamization’ period during the Afghan-Soviet War. The ruler of Pakistan during the AfghanSoviet War was General Zia-ul-Haq who was a conservative Muslim. He wanted to use Islamic
parties to influence the war in Afghanistan and undermine democratic parties within Pakistan.
Jamaat-e-Islami became a tool for Pakistani government under General Zia-ul-Haq as the antithesis
to the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP). It also helped with the ‘Islamization’ policy of the ‘State’ as Zia
highlighted Islam as the source of “national identity”. 15 He later legitimized his governance based on
religion and put forth many reforms under the above policy. The promotion of Jamaat-e-Islami and
other orthodox-Hanafi groups intensified sectarianism within Pakistan thus escalating anti-Shia
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militancy. 16 The eventual goal of General Zia was to make Pakistan a ‘Sunni-Hanafi’ state with no
challengers from within. 17 General Zia-ul-Haq also saw the Jamaat (JI) as a national reconciliation
front to keep order within Pakistan. In the early 80’s, despite very little influence in the national
political affairs, the Jamaat (JI) was handed over to the Ministries of Education and Information by
General Zia. 18 This move was pivotal because it was the first time a Islamist party had been given a
legitimate role in the government. This also introduced various reforms within the schooling system
as ‘Islamiat’ (study of Islam) was added as compulsory to graduate out of matriculation (10th grade).
This led to the eventual demise of the public educational system thus leading many poor families to
educate their offspring in madrassas. The Jamaat also played an important role in the Afghan Jihad
as it was affiliated with Hizb-e-Islami and its leader Gulbuddin Hikmetyar. 19 The Jamaat received
various aid packages along with weapons and arms from the ISI to help with the Mujahedeens. 20
The Pakistan government supported the Ghilzai Pashtuns over the Durrani Pashtuns because of
their stance against bring back King Zahir Shah. 21
Jamaat-e-Ulema-e-Islami (JUI) is considered the origin of Taliban as a ‘movement.’ It is the
JUI that gave the Taliban the education, training, manpower, and resources to become a force in
Afghanistan. In the beginning Jamaat-e-Ulema-e-Islami (JUI) was politically ignored because it did
not conform to the belief system of the President General Zia-ul-Haq and it did not have manpower
to contribute for the Afghan Jihad. The JUI did receive aid to construct and manage hundreds of
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madrassas throughout NWFP (Northwest Frontier Province of Pakistan) and Baluchistan. 22 The aid
also came from Saudi Arabia that brought the Wahabi ideals along with many foreign fighters. 23 The
JUI was critical of the military regime because it felt left out of the massive donations that the
Jamaat-e-Islami had received from Pakistan and the United States. Although JUI did not play any
role in the Afghan-Soviet war it did operate the madrassas and gave aid to in the Mujahedeen
refugee camps. 24 In the 1980’s JUI had built up a sophisticated support system through their
madrassas in Baluchistan and NWFP with the Durranis which irked the Pakistani government. 25
From its very inception the JUI had a strong resentment towards the United States; however the US
government ignored this animosity because the madrassas conformed to the anti-communist policy
of the 1980’s. 26 These madrassas laid the foundation of both political and ideological mobilization
for the movement which will eventually be called ‘The Taliban.’ Many of the Taliban including its
leader Mullah Omar (Amir ul Momineen) were indoctrinated in these madrassas in the strict
conservative ideals of Deobandi. 27 These madrassas provided shelter, food, clothing, and security for
students who had very little to nothing. It also gave them a sense of direction with renewed hope for
the future as they learned strict interpretation of Islam.
The JUI stayed isolated from political recognition in Pakistan as they opposed both the first
Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Shariff governments. JUI remained in the opposition of from 1989 to
1990 (Bhutto) and 1990 to 1993 (Shariff). There were many domestic reasons why JUI was in the
opposition such as regulating finances of madrassas and reforms on religious institutions. The JUI
did not want their finances which were mostly from donations by other states mainly Saudi Arabia
22
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to be examined by the government. They were hiding these donations in the form of Zakat
(donation) which in Pakistani law does not have to be disclosed. JUI was able to make a concession
deal before 1993 elections with Bhutto’s party on most of the reforms. One of the most important
concessions was given on the finances of the madrassas which would be disclosed partially to the
public/government. They aligned themselves with the PPP (Benazir) which eventually won the
elections and became part of the ruling coalition. 28 This was important for the JUI as it now had the
political ‘stamp of approval’ to expand its operations beyond the general education of Islamist
ideology. Maulana Fazl-ur-Rehman (leader of JUI) was made Chairman of National Assembly’s
Standing Committee for Foreign Affairs which gave him authoritative power in foreign relations. 29
He made numerous trips to the United States and Europe to gain support for the Taliban. His most
important visits were to the Gulf States and Saudi Arabia where he asked for financial support for
the Taliban and recognition of them as legitimate rulers of Afghanistan. 30 By July 1996, after a secret
visit by Prince Turki al-Faisal Saud (head of Saudi Intelligence) Saudi Arabia became the principle
financial sponsor of the Taliban. 31 The ISI also started supporting the JUI with materials and arms
and thus shifting the earlier policy of supporting Jamaat-e-Islami and Hizb-e-Islami as its proxy in
Afghanistan. The change in policy was due to the ineffectiveness of Hikmetyar and his men in
capturing Kabul. The PPP government wanted JUI to offset Jamaat-e-Islami for their national
political ambitions. This juncture was crucial in establishing support for the Taliban and its
adventures in Afghanistan.
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The Taliban revolution in Afghanistan had its foundation in the ideology, politics, and
economics of Islamist groups fashioned in Afghan-Soviet war. Thus the unrelenting support from
the United States and the Pakistani government throughout the Afghan-Soviet war provided much
of the logistical and financial resources necessary for these radical groups to come forth as the
dominant political movement in Afghanistan, filling a vacuum that existed due to the collapse of
local village economies. Political leaders within the Pakistani state had their own ambitions to create
a friendlier regional environment even by taking the risks of giving support to radical fundamentalist
groups that could potentially harm its own interest in the future. The thinking of both United State
and Pakistan was narrow and short term. They did not envisage the emergence of radical Islamist
groups as a threat to their security; rather they used these groups as conduits for the attainment of
short-term political and geostrategic interests. They had underestimated the power of ideology and
how it can mobilize and militarize a movement well beyond the intentions of its original supporters.
Gramsci’s understanding of ideology is equipped to better understand how novel concepts such as
Deobandi movement can be ‘refined’ once their concepts become ‘more’ universal. 32 Deobandi was
introduced in the nineteenth century to explain the relationship between Islam and the current
political situation under the colonial rule. The argument was based on the separation of church and
state which was carefully structured by the Deobandi scholars as ‘baseless’ within a Muslim society.
The basic tenet of Deobandi is to seek an accord from classical text (Quran) with the current
political fervor (colonialism). The writings and teachings are based on the nineteenth century
colonial occupation and how Muslims can overcome the constraints in practicing Islam within the
confines of occupying political, economic, and ideological colonials. The conservative Muslims felt
that colonial ambitions were to neutralize Islam based on historical grounds which did not translate
into the present political and economic language. The Deobandi movement was ‘refined’ by the
32

Barker, Rodney S. Political Ideas and Political Action. Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 2000. 94. Print.

Islamist (Taliban) as they replaced old foes (colonials) with a new enemy (Mujahedeens and later US,
NATO, and allies) within its ideological confines which reflected their belief. They used this
contextual understanding to their advantage in creating an autonomous and political sub-culture
within a largely moderate society (Afghanistan). The resolve of this misstep resulted in a phenomena
called the ‘Taliban,’ which continues to be a political and ideological force in Afghanistan to the
present day, even as US and NATO troops are occupying the country with the objective of
weakening, if not destroying, this movement.
Chapter II. Spheres of Dominance
In order to understand the emergence of ‘Taliban’ one needs to focus on the environment of
Afghanistan, the land, the people, and its cultural and religious orientations. The total collapse of the
political economy of the Afghan village created a vacuum which was filled by a radical ‘movement’
with promises of stability and traditional values. This chapter focuses on the importance of Afghan
traditions and how these traditions affect the way of life of the Afghanistan population, especially at
the level of the village political economy. The study will also highlight how dominant ethnic culture
(Pashtuns) has overlapped ethnic boundaries in order to build a consensus on the social structure of
Afghanistan. An ancient code of life called ‘Pashtunwali’ (social structure) is discussed to show how
there is a national consensus of behavior model which predates Islam. Lastly the ‘spheres of
influence’ within the Afghan village is explicated to better understand how Taliban have swayed the
rural villagers to their side, either through the use of violent repression or through negotiated
political maneuvers that are both products of the destruction of the Afghan village economy.

Afghanistan is a landlocked country with an estimated population of 28.396 million
inhabitants. 33 The Pashtun are the most prominent ethnic group making up an estimated 42 percent
of the population. 34 The other major ethnic groups are: Tajiks (27 percent), Uzbeks (9 percent),
Hazaras (9 percent), Aimak (4 percent), Turkmen (3 Percent), and Baloch (2 percent). 35 An
estimated 80 percent of all Afghans live in rural areas and work on agro industry or related fields. 36
Through 1978 the Afghan economy was heavily dependent on agriculture as its primary mode of
economics. The relationship between urban and rural is of dependency to provide means for growth
through agriculture. Afghanistan is based on an agrarian society which over the years has developed
its urban cities (Kabul, Kandahar, etc) through cultivating cash crops. The village and their
inhabitants are still the most important factor in Afghanistan as they control the economics, food
supply, and the majority of the population. Thus the urban-rural divide is very important to
understand for economic and social stability as it is an instrument commonly used by the Taliban
and its predecessors the Mujahedeen to win over the majority of the populace. Neamatollah Nojumi
describes how instrumental the rural areas were in winning the Afghan-Soviet war:
“In a country such as Afghanistan, pressure directed at the cities from the rural areas is the most
important military and political strategy of winning a war; because of the country’s economic and
social system and geographical features, the bulk of Mujhadeen’s economic resources (financial and
food supply) came from local communities, in particular the rural areas.” 37
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The importance of the Afghan village and its system of governance is vital to understanding
how the ‘Taliban’ movement established itself in Afghanistan. It is important to identify what the
‘spheres of influence’ are within an Afghan village and how the ‘Taliban’ manipulated them to their
advantage. Another important aspect is that the Afghan village is a decentralized component of the
state. Historically the Afghan villages seldom relied on the central government in Kabul to provide
any assistance for local governance. The Afghan village is an independent body which governs its
own affairs through a moral code of laws called Pashtunwali and Islam is its unifying factor. The
spheres of influence are embedded within the Afghan village and if neutralized they can be bent into
shaping a new society within its confines. It is imperative to comprehend how this system
(Pashtunwali) operates in a modus operandi context within the village structure of Afghanistan.
Literal translation of Pashtunwali is, “the way of the Pashtun” and it is an unwritten “code of
life” that predates Islam. 38 It has shaped the Afghan society of today and even non-Pashtun
ethnicities abide by its central ideas and societal practices. This has become a symbol of unity
amongst Pashtun Jirga and non-Pashtun Shura throughout Afghanistan. 39 Although Pashtunwali was
well established before Islam, it coincided with many of the beliefs of the Sharia through the Hanafi
School of law. 40 This made the adoption of the new religion (Islam) more harmonious in
Afghanistan. For Pashtuns there is no distinction between practicing Pashtunwali, being Muslim, or
being Pashtun. 41 The concept of Pashtunwali overlies the ideology of the Sharia. While the Sharia
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represents the moral authority over humanity, Pashtunwali represents honor (izzat) and integrity to a
Pashtun. 42
There are nine concepts within Pashtunwali that are essential to its structure. These nine
ideals are: Melmasti (hospitality), Nanawati (asylum), Badal (revenge), Tureh (bravery), Sabat
(loyalty), Imandari (righteousness), Isteqamat (persistence), Ghayrat (right to defend “their property,
their honor and their family’s honor”), and Namus (men defending honor of women). 43 Pashtuns
must adhere to the beliefs of Pashtunwali in order to preserve their honor (izzat). Pashtuns without
honor is not considered part of the Pashtun community thus relegating their identity, privileges,
security, and support. These moral laws are governed through a council called Jirga which works as a
legislative body of governance on a regional and village level. The members of the Jirga are men with
high honor and integrity. Most of the time they are the village elders who practice Pashtunwali and
its principles to the core.
There are two socio-economic classes within Pashtuns and they both define Pashtunwali
within their own setting. The wealthy urban landowners are called qalang (“tax”) group while the
rural Pashtuns consider themselves as nang (“chivalrous”) group. 44 There are differences between
the two social classes yet the Pashtunwali code is universal and thus followed beyond any spatial
boundaries. There are various principles of Pashtunwali that overlaps one another. The concept of
Melmastia (hospitality) overlaps with Nanawati (asylum); Pashtun are very hospitable people and
they will go as far as to defend the honor (izzat) of their guests. Hospitality entails various different
things along with providing food, shelter, living space, money, etc. for strangers and friends alike.
The more hospitable a Pashtun the more respect he gains amongst his peers and community. The
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Nanawati (asylum) rule applies as long as the guest is within the confines of the host. The host will
repel any advances of the enemy against his guest thus protecting his honor.
Ghayrat (chivalry) and Badal (revenge) also overlap each other within the confines of
Pashtunwali. Ghayrat has two main concepts which are defined as honor within a battle and proper
defense of one’s honor. There are also norms within battle and/or defense of one’s honor such as
no civilians should be targeted and distribution of war booty must be equally dispersed. Within the
Gayrat framework Pashtuns have a right to defend their property, family, and honor and thus by
protecting these facets one can start a feud with another family thus engaging in Badal (revenge).
Badal gives Pashtun families the right to defend their honor without any legal ramification from the
Jirga (council) as long as it is not extreme. Majority of the Badal (revenge) cycle within Pashtuns
revolves around murders and thus it gives the other family every right to defend the honor of the
deceased. Within the Afghan society Badal serves as mode of deterrence for murderous propensities
thus creating a systematic order within the community.
Another important concept is Namus as it is relatively defined as men defending women’s
honor at ‘all cost.’ 45 This introduces the gender segregation within the Afghan society and thus
introduces the concept of Purdah, which is from the Urdu language which means “veil.” The concept
of purdah came from Greeks, Persians and Byzantine societies which maintained the same gender
boundaries particularly in ‘urban’ environment. 46 If one offends these gender boundaries in an
Afghan society this provides ample reasoning for defending their namus. The boundaries are for
both male and females and it reflects the dignified image of Pashtun within the society. In the
western society people often think that purdah (veil) is a way of controlling women yet it also
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controls men. These social structures were never meant to be institutionalized but due to the lapse in
security over decades of war Taliban enacted strict spaces for women and men. The norm of namus
restricts men as much as women because within the Afghan society spatial boundaries cannot be
infringed upon. Men cannot intrude on women spaces just as much as women cannot enter any
male confines. This was more social than physical gender boundaries and over the years Afghan
society had adopted and structured these norms through collective order. The villages were far
stricter in its governance yet never enacted extreme judgments against accusers of crossing social
restrictions. Kabul, Herat, and other cities were far less intrusive of women and their role within the
society and thus enabled varying roles for females in government, schools, hospitals, and other social
activities.
It is important to understand the concept of Pashtunwali to grasp the ‘spheres of influence’
within an Afghan village. An Afghan village has many intricate concepts working within each other
that lay the foundation of order, security, and ideology. This discernment was carefully illustrated by
Mark Sexton and William S. Lind in an article titled, “On War # 325: How the Taliban Take an Afghan
Village.” Although the article does not detail an Afghan village life it highlights how the ‘Taliban’ can
take over a village and make it their own with very few challenges. An Afghan village is made up of
three influencing bodies that at times intersect with each other on various issues. The three ‘spheres
of influence’ are Jirga (council), Mullah (religious leader), and Lashkar (village security/militia). 47
These three form the basis of Afghan village society and create a political structure to maintain
order, offer social services, and provide security. Any hindrance of these three essential roles within
the village can have a devastating and adverse affect on the populace. At various times throughout
the history of Afghanistan the central government has tried to influence these three ‘spheres of
47
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influence’ with limited success. An Afghan village is highly decentralized in decision making,
economics, and ideological resolve. It does not like interference from national government nor any
foreign occupying forces. This pits the village system at odds with the state as the structure of the
‘spheres of influence’ becomes an entity rivaling the centralized government.

Mullah
(Religious
Leader)

‘Spheres of influence’ in an Afghan
Village.

Afghan
Village
Jirga (Council)

Lashkar (Village
security/militia)

The Jirga (council) comprises village elders and are mostly men who practice Pashtunwali
and are highly respected within the community. 48 The Jirga literally means “circle” and rules over the
village affairs through consensus. 49 This is a much decentralized entity of an Afghan village where
48
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locals come to seek advice and counsel on problems emanating from village disputes, including
marriage, land, farming, etc. The council serves as a political and administrative entity for the village
thus helping with family feuds (badal) and keeping in line with the Pashtun traditions. The Jirga does
not have ‘permanent members’ thus illustrating its decentralized structure and value system. 50
The second ‘sphere of influence’ in an Afghan village is the Mullah (religious leader). The
literal translation of Mullah is a “priest” and he leads the daily prayers (local mosque) and conducts
Islamic education (local madrassa) within the Afghan village. 51 The role of the Mullah is very
important as he serves the community in various aspects including funeral ceremonies, Sharia
advisor, education, marriage ceremonies, etc. Over ninety percent of all Afghans are of Sunni Hanafi
sect which is the most liberal of the four schools. 52 The highly decentralized structure of Sunni
Hanafi school of thought made it extremely difficult for the centralized entity to govern over village
affairs. It was the village Mullahs who were against any centralized structure to overtake the ‘spheres
of influence’ as they deemed the Mosque as the center of Afghan village life. 53 Although the Mullahs
in the village are generally ‘not’ educated, their influence is far and wide.
The last ‘sphere of influence’ is the Lashkar (village security/militia). The literal meaning of
Lashkar is “tribal militia.” 54 The Lashkar is comprised on men from the village who provide security
from within as well as against outsiders and is mobilized on orders of the Jirga. It also functions as
the enforcement apparatus for the Jirga. The village Lashkar provides an ordering principle for the
other ‘spheres of influence’ to function without any external pressure. This gives autonomy over
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local affairs to the other entities (Jirga and Mullah) to do as they please without any hindrance. The
Lashkar also serves as deterrence within the Afghan village to minimize family feuds (Badal).
The ‘spheres of influence’ are a very important part of an Afghan village. Various entities
have tried to centralize these ‘spheres’ to no avail. The Soviets tried to dismantle the Afghan village
by numerous bombing campaigns and killings yet the three spheres held together and defeated the
much stronger adversary. The United States have tried various different tactics including forward
recon bases outside of many rural Afghan villages. This has also netted no gain for local Afghan
sympathies as it seems to negate the local order rather than work within the framework. The total
destruction of the local Afghan village would be instrumental in the rise of the ‘Taliban.’ The gaps
within security, stability, and economic welfare will lead locals to radical resolve thus enabling
‘Taliban’ style governance to hail supreme.
Chapter 3: Disrupting the Spheres of Influence
The behavior of the Soviet Union after the invasion to undermine the local Afghan village
economy severed the intricate balance between rural and urban. The Soviets wanted to preserve
power within a centralized government much like the US and its allies three decades after. By
centralizing power in Kabul it gave rise to the minority population of the urban society (20%) which
was outnumbered by the rural (80%). There are three important facets to the occupiers and their
ideological stance on projection and preservation of power within Afghanistan. First both the US
and Soviets wanted to sustain power from a centralized hub (Kabul) so it can be manageable.
Second they both focused on a military solution that involved attacking insurgents in the rural areas
which contributed to the destabilization of the village economy. Third the Taliban (and before them
the Mujahedeens) proved remarkably adaptable in responding to each shift in foreign military
strategy with corresponding shift in guerilla tactics.

The vacuum that was created diluted the ‘spheres of influence’ within the Afghan village.
This led to the radical alignment of ideological warfare between the Mujahedeens and the Soviets
along with Afghan communists which eventually led to the military conflict. The framework is
important for this study to understand how foreign powers can destabilize a complicated system
thus leaving room for radical thoughts to emerge or re-emerge within the State. The ‘Taliban’ is not
self-defining in its interest rather it is an organization that is created due to the vacuity of political,
economical, and ideological order. The Soviets wanted to preserve Afghanistan under its umbrella of
influence thus undermining the ‘ground realities’ of Afghan villages. The same premise is being
highlighted by the allied forces currently occupying Afghanistan. The re-emergence of the ‘Taliban’
is a clear proof that ‘ground realities’ of the Afghan villagers are not being examined by the central
government or the foreign occupying armies. Consequently, the ‘Taliban’ are infiltrating the local
Afghan villages with the promise of stability and order with the re-emergence of its own government
that speaks loudly to the traditions, (Pashtunwali) and histories of Afghanistan. This chapter will
focus on the Soviet invasion and its similarities to the current conflict with the US and NATO
occupying forces. The chapter will also discuss how the occupation is disrupting the Afghan village
economy and has created a vacuum that is leading the re-emergence of the ‘Taliban.’ Further, it will
highlight the mass exodus of refugees to neighboring Pakistan and Iran which will create an
environment for radical ideologies to breed. The migration of refugees to Pakistan will be essential
in the emergence of ‘Taliban’ (movement) as the antithesis to the state in the coming years. The
refugees make the bulk of the ‘Taliban’ who had to leave Afghan villages’ in-order to survive the
bombing campaigns from Soviets and Afghan communists. The refugee camps will become the
honing ground for radical ideological indoctrination that will eventually lead to a strict interpretation
of Sharia under the ‘Taliban’ regime in Afghanistan. This chapter will further underline how Pakistan

wanted to use the refugees in its regional and domestic policy to give political and military depth
within the region.
The first category of centralizing power within Kabul can be traced back to the early
invasion by the Soviets. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1979) was in direct support of Babrak
Karmal government to quell opposition to that government at local level. The Soviets did not intend
to stay in Afghanistan for an extended period as it wanted to give power back to the regime and its
armed forces. 55 In the early stages Soviet troops did not engage in fighting and kept a low profile as
advisors, trainers, and organizational supporters of the regime. Due to the rapid rise of the
Mujahedeens within the rural population the Soviets started engaging in combat operations by the
late 1980s. 56 This led to the demise of the local Afghan village economy as the brunt of the fighting
took place on the farm fields and villages. The Soviets devised a plan to subside the rebellion by
destroying crops and engaging in the systematic killing of farmers. This strategy was undertaken
because it spread “terror” amongst the local villagers and destroyed the “food supplies” which was
used for “sustenance” and feeding of insurgency. 57 The Soviets also destroyed the irrigation systems,
(qanats) which were essential to the farms, in order to depopulate the villages. 58 Wheat is the central
food source which was grown on “fifty percent” of the “irrigated and dry-farmed land” in
Afghanistan. 59 Wheat was also one of the main crops destroyed by the Soviets to control the
insurgency.
The destruction of farms would be crucial in the comings years as Afghanistan went through
various droughts which led to the over reliance on foreign imports of agricultural products and gave
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rise to the Afghan opium trade. It is important to understand the breakdown of the village economic
system to grasp why the ‘Taliban’ movement came into being. The collapse of the rural economy
also destabilized the central government of Babrak Karmal because it could not sustain itself under
the immense pressure. These voids within the village system came from the invading Soviet army
much like the bombardment after the September 11 attacks by the allied forces. The Soviets wanted
to shift the balance of power to the Karmal regime yet it destroyed the structure of Afghan villages
which would eventually bring down the central government. Again the emphasis from the Soviets
was on the centralized government much like today as US and its allies rally around the Karzai
government while ignoring the village economy. These mishaps led the way for groups of
‘Mujahedeens’ to take up arms against its own people (Afghan communists) and fight the ‘power’ on
their level (guerilla warfare). The Mujahedeens adapted to various changes in occupying military
tactics and emerged victorious due to the inability of the centralized government to quell uprising in
the rural Afghanistan. The re-emergence of ‘Taliban’ in Afghanistan is being shaped within the
same context as United States and its allies have taken place of the occupying army much like its
predecessor three decades earlier. The US, NATO, and other allies including non-government
organization have supplied the central government of Hamid Karzai with billions of dollars to
stabilize the country and undermine its indigenous economy. Since 2001, the allies have provided
over $38 billion dollars in aid and another $10 billion is expected in 2010. 60 Due to the enormous
amount of aid along with ground troops the Karzai regime is sustaining itself for now while the
‘Taliban’ are waging guerrilla war which is gaining momentum. The Afghan villages again are in the
central role for the ‘Taliban’ much like they were for the Mujahedeen against the Soviets. The
adaptability by the Taliban against the occupiers shows their resolve to the shifting policies of the
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US, NATO and its allies. US and its allies are still trying to find a military solution to the problem
thus keeping focus on centralizing power in Kabul and ignoring the dynamics of village politics,
economics, and ideological grounds.
It is imperative to understand the occupation in three broad categories as stated earlier and
the second is military solution to domesticated problem. At the peak of the war the Soviets
commitment was “90,000 to 104,000” yet despite the large occupying force the total security
envisioned by Moscow was never achieved.61 The security apparatus was limited to major cities and
townships and ignored thousands of villages which were essential to the power make-up of
Afghanistan. This structure is based on centralized power which is imperative for the strategy to
work properly. The commitment to centralizing power and not giving in to the demands of stability
through decentralization produced a vacuum in governing structure which the Soviets thought could
be overcome by coercion.
The third category underlines the adaptability of Soviet and Afghan troops to the
unconventional ways of their adversaries. The Soviet troops were trained for conventional armed
conflicts and did not possess expertise on guerilla warfare. This gave an advantage to the
‘Mujahedeens’ who were well versed on the surrounding terrain and used ‘hit and run’ tactics against
heavily armed Soviets. 62 On the contrary the U.S troop level in Afghanistan for the year 2010 is
estimated at over 100,000 with no direction or end to conflict in retrospect. 63 The ‘Taliban’ much
like their predecessors (Mujahedeens) are using the same guerilla tactics to engage coalition troops
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with much success to the dismay of the occupying forces. The coalition troops are abandoning many
village outposts to concentrate their power in large cities and its surroundings. According to NATO,
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) is taking a backseat due to lack of deployable troops and
security conditions on the ground. 64 NATO had plans to deploy 22 teams of PRTs yet only five are
operational. These teams are providing security and undertaking infrastructure projects which will
help stabilize Afghan economy and increase political powers of the central government. 65 Due to
lack of manpower and operational conditions the Afghan villages are struggling and the reemergence of ‘Taliban’ is gaining valuable impetus. This highlights the similar policy used by the
Soviets thus undermining the village economy and its structure to safeguard the minority of the
urban dwellers.
The ten year occupation (1979-1989) of Afghanistan by the Soviets was very costly and some
scholars believe that it was one of the main reasons for the collapse of the Soviet state. 66 The cost of
war was severe for Soviet Union not just militarily but also in politics and economics. The Soviet
military was shocked at how easily the mighty ‘Red Army’ succumbed to a guerrilla outfit that called
itself the ‘Mujahedeens.’ By the end of the war senior analysts and military personnel of Frunze
Military Academy (Moscow) detailed the tactics of Mujahedeens in a report. It is important to
understand the reasons for an eventual defeat of the Soviet forces in Afghanistan. The report stated
the following:
“Several combat principles lay at the heart of Mujahedeen tactics. First, they avoided direct contact
with the superior might of regular forces which could have wiped them out. Second the Mujahedeen
practically never conducted positional warfare and, when threatened with encirclement, would
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abandon their positions. Third in all forms of combat the Mujahedeen always strove to achieve
surprise. Fourth the Mujahedeen employed terror and ideological conditioning on a peaceful populace
as well as on local government representatives.
The Mujahedeen knew the terrain intimately, were natural scouts, and were capable of transmitting
the necessary information about secret Soviet unit and subunit movements over great distances using
rudimentary communications gear and signaling devices. [Echoes of the nineteenth-century
heliographs that tracked the British army’s retreat from Kabul].
Among the guerrilla forces tactical strong suits were all types of night actions, the ability to rapidly
and clandest inely move in t he mount ain, and t he fielding of a very broad agent reconnaissance
network.” 67
The ‘Taliban’ inherited all of the Mujahedeen’s tactics and reinforced them with new
weaponry and training. The most important line of this report is how the Mujahedeen used ideology
or coercion as a tool to garner support from the ‘friendly’ local villagers and government officials.
Although the coalition troops are heavily armed and outnumber the ‘Taliban’ there are many
disadvantages. Due to lack of manpower (ground troops), corrupt central government (Karzai),
security concerns and slow progress on rebuilding infrastructure the ‘Taliban’ are enjoying the same
environment as did the Mujahedeens three decades before.
In the course of the occupation the Soviets lost 14,263 troops and 49,985 were permanently
wounded. 68 Over one million Afghans were killed during the war and more than five million fled to
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the neighboring countries of Pakistan and Iran as refugees. 69 Pakistan received the bulk of the
Afghans with an estimate of 3.3 to 4 million which were located in “344 refugee villages.” 70 A
majority of the refugees (70 percent) were encamped in NWFP (North West Frontier Province) and
FATA (Federal Administered Tribal Area) region, while Baluchistan (25 percent) and Punjab (5
percent) also greeted many Afghans. 71 The two countries had very different foreign, domestic, and
regional policy goals in regards to the refugees and Afghanistan. Pakistan gave the Afghan resistance
an opportunity to create a ‘state in exile’ and wage guerilla war against the Soviets and Afghan
communists. This idea was heavily backed by the US, Pakistan, China, Saudi Arabia, and other anticommunist states. Afghanistan became the proxy for the larger ‘game’ that will entail the ‘west’
against the communists. In Pakistan the refugee camps were maintained by government (Pakistan
Army and Frontier Corps), non-government, and Islamist network. The Jamaat-e-Ulema-e-Islami
(JUI) emerged with a sophisticated network of madrassas from FATA to Baluchistan. The goal for
JUI was to educate the Mujahedeens and their children in a Deobandi conservative Islam.
On the other hand the Iranian regime prevented the Afghans to build a ‘state in exile’ thus
integrating them into the society to become self-sufficient. 72 Most of the refugees in Iran lived in
urban areas while in Pakistan they were limited to the camps. Iran also prevented Afghan refugees
from political and military actions against Soviets because they saw United Nations and other NGOs
as ‘western tool’ to destabilize their regime. Iran was also pre-occupied with Iraq at the time the
occupation began in Afghanistan. On the contrary, Pakistan wanted a friendly neighbor in
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Afghanistan and put forth a welcoming policy as an important national and regional security
interest. 73
Lastly another foreign actor within Afghanistan was its immediate neighbor Pakistan. The
strategy of Pakistan was to support the government in exile (Peshawar Shura) and help militarily set
up camps for Mujahedeens with the help of US and Saudi funds. 74 Pakistan treated the Afghan
refugees as a political extension of their regional and domestic policy. They felt that Afghans gave
them depth on military and political grounds against their arch enemy India. The refugees gave the
Pakistani state manpower that could be directed to other theaters, most importantly Kashmir. The
Afghan nationals gave Pakistan the ‘deniability’ of interfering thus enhancing strategic options within
the region (mainly against India). 75 Zia wanted Afghan Mujahedeen to continue their fight long after
the complete withdrawal of the Soviets. He envisioned that the ISI would redirect their attention
from the Afghan jihad to help Kashmiri separatist against their struggle with India based on
ideological grounds. 76 Pakistan also wanted to quell domestic insurgency that was being waged on by
Baloch separatist in Baluchistan. They wanted the refugees to overwhelm the province in sheer
number to subdue the separatist without raising any eyebrows from international or domestic
community leaders. Thus tensions between the Pashtun and Baloch had risen throughout the
Afghan-Soviet war and subsequently with the Taliban takeover as more refugees (Pashtu-speaking)
barged into Baluchistan. 77 The refugees were treated very well and they had access to the state and
provincial resources. Pakistan did not want the refugees as a militarized entity rather they wanted to
make a case for the world how well they were being treated for the massive aid packages. The
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refugees were free to travel and resettle anywhere in Pakistan and had access to local resources.
Although the recruitment for various militias (Mujahedeens) was from these camps, the training was
far outside the premises. Pakistan wanted the refugees to go back once the withdrawal of Soviet
troops has taken place and rally around the Mujahedeen group of their choosing. They also felt that
through Pakistani education and good gesture the territorial dispute and nationalistic goals of
Pakhtunistan will be lost due to this new generation who has a positive image of Pakistan as its
neighbor. Pakistan wanted a friendly government after the withdrawal and was willing to back some
radical elements such as Hizb-e-Islami (Gulbuddin Hikmetyar) for this purpose. Eventually this
miss-step would lead to vacuum in Afghanistan which will be later filled by the ‘Taliban.’
Chapter 4: Filling the Vacuum
The chronological order that can sum up the eventual demise of the political economy of the
village system along with the old governance can be broken down into four groupings. The first
underlies the importance of the complete withdrawal by the Soviets from Afghanistan. The
withdrawal did not encompass the end of aid from Moscow which led to the immediate survival of
Najibullah government much to the dismay of US and its supporters. Although there were
significant divide within the Najibullah government it still survived long enough for the west to
question the Mujahedeen and their political ambitions. Second the government in exile (Peshawar
Shura) did not come up with a conclusive agreement of leadership amongst the Mujahedeen groups.
This led to the infighting amongst Mujahedeens contesting power of one another for the control of
Afghanistan. Third, one of the most powerful Mujahedeen leader, Gulbuddin Hikmetyar did not
abide by the Peshawar Shura ruling of joint government thus civil war broke up again for the control
of Kabul. Lastly, the students who had helped the Mujahedeen fight the Najibullah government
were again faced with fighting which hampered their religious studies. The students were very upset
about the criminal and non-Islamic activities of Afghan Mujahedeens and saw themselves as the

“cleansers of the war gone astray and social and political system that had become derailed.” 78 This
group of student will eventually become the ‘Taliban.’
The withdrawal of the Soviet troops in 1989 marks the first important facet on the
chronological order that will eventually lead to more conflict and struggle for power within
Afghanistan. The U.S. and its allies thought the Najibullah government will fall into the hands of
Mujahedeen which will lead to a unified government. The U.S. and their allies had recognized the
Peshawar Shura (government in exile) prematurely and did not completely understand that the
Mujahedeens were not conventional fighters. The Najibullah government was still being heavily
supported by the Soviets with arms, materials, and cash. The Soviets were determined in formulating
a friendly government in Afghanistan to keep them under its umbrella of influence. Accordingly,
they spent 3-4 billion dollars per year immediately after withdrawal till 1991 when an armistice was
signed between U.S. and Soviets to end military aid packages to Afghanistan. 79 The great powers
were still at play under the notion of defeating ‘others’ ideology (communism/capitalism) within the
state. Regional actors such as Pakistan were eager to appoint leadership within Afghanistan that will
extend their influence to rectify various disputes and have a friendly government on the Western
border. The immediacy of an armed struggle against the Najibullah government was apparent as
various different factions of Mujahedeens wanted to preserve power for themselves. Some of these
factions were strong armed by the policy of regional actors such as Pakistan and Iran. To add, there
was no consensus within the Mujahedeen groups and the Shura (council) in Peshawar (state in exile)
did not come to conclusive agreements on power sharing. This led to anarchy within the state with
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no cohesive ordering mechanism in sight. The government of Najibullah had lost its enforcement
mechanism in Soviet Army thus it had to play a ‘social’ role to gain acceptance.
Najibullah projected himself as a practicing Muslim and an ardent nationalist after the
withdrawal within his own country yet to the outsiders (West) he was a stern anti-Islamist. 80 After
the withdrawal, Najibullah set aside a national reconciliation agenda which forwent the earlier ideals
of PDPA communist/Leninist takeover by political, ideological, and economic norms. The new
principles were much more inclined to nationalistic ideals which reflected his Pashtun ancestry but
the Afghans were very skeptical. The People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) changed its
name to Hizb-e-Watan (Fatherland Party) which was more aligned with the nationalistic image. 81
Some of the reforms were of bringing Islam and Pashtun nationalism to the forefront of party
politics. Even with these reforms there was much conflict within the inner circles of the party which
had strong divisions amongst Khalqs and Parchams. The divide was amongst rural and urban
popular fronts which sought political integration and recognition. The Khalqis were all from rural
Afghanistan thus representing the village political, economics, and ideological system. 82 Most
Khalqis belonged to Pashtun tribes yet there were some minority groups (non-Pashtun) that were
aligned within the party. They belonged to poor rural grouping which made 80% of Afghanistan and
thus wanted more say about their affairs. The Perchamis were ‘urbanites’ who were wealthy and
belonged mostly to non-Pashtun minority groups. The Perchamis were less inclined to nationalistic
and societal ideals and thus supported the more liberal ‘internationalist’ position. 83 They also worked
within the framework of the government rather than oppose like the Khalqis. Both parties were well
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educated and choose variants of Marxist ideology from the Soviet/Leninist and the Tudeh Party
(Iran) literature.
Najibullah replaced the Supreme Council with Perchamis as the majority which led to the
ouster of many non-PDPA and Khalqis members. The Perchamis were loyal to the Najibullah
government and the Khalqis were close to the military establishment of Afghanistan. This division
also represented the rural and urban divide as the administrative side of the government being held
by Perchamis and coercive side by Khalqis. Najibullah came under immense pressure within his
inner circles as there was a coup led by General Shahnawaz Tanai, Chief of Staff of Afghan armed
forces. The coup was in response to the arrest and trial of 124 Khalqis members. In March 1990,
Tanai aligned himself with Hikmetyar and tried to overthrow Najibullah government. 84 The coup
was more on the lines of ethnic and personal tensions between the Khalqis and Perchamis rather
than ideological.
The US wanted Najibullah to resign as the President of Afghanistan and recognized the
Peshawar Shura and its government in Pakistan. According to undersecretary of state Robert
Kimmitt, “a stable political settlement is not achievable so long as the Najib regime remains in
power. This is not a US demand; it is a statement of Afghan reality.” 85 On these premises the U.S.
provided arms and support to the radical Mujahedeen groups to undermine Najibullah and his
Soviet allies. US had the belief that Kabul will fall immediately after the withdrawal of Soviet troops
because of all the military successes of the Mujahedeens. What the US failed to understand was that
the Mujahedeens were guerilla outfit and did have the technical knowledge on how to engage enemy
through conventional means. To add, Mujahedeen groups did not have heavy arms to attack a well
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fortified position like Kabul. US also failed to recognize the deteriorating factor of unification
between the Mujahedeens which were now showing ethnical divisions. The divisions were ‘coming
of age’ because various warring factions wanted power to be preserved within their sphere of
influence. Once the US recognized the complexity surrounding its Afghan policy it tried to approach
Soviet Union with proposals to eliminate aid bilaterally. The shift came in recognition by the Bush
Administration that the Afghan government in exile was in no position of power over the warring
factions. US also believed that arming anti-American Islamist in Afghanistan can destabilize the
entire region thus an immediate call to end arms supply to Hikmetyar along with other radical
Islamists were put in place. Although the arms supply was halted by 1991, no mention of ending aid
to madrassas was made either publicly or in private. This kept the operation of Jamaat-i-UlemaIslami on track and progressing throughout the border region of Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Saudi Arabia and Pakistan had also recognized the government in exile and had supported
them on various levels. Pakistan’s Intelligence Agency the ISI was the architect on aid disbursement
and training which gave them enormous power over various Mujahedeen groups. Saudi Arabia was
one of the main financiers of Afghan jihad and groups like the Hikmetyar faction received special
treatment. Hikmetyar also had special relations with the ISI and the government of Pakistan because
of his political ideals which were in line with the latter. Pakistan and Saudi Arabia both ‘quietly’
accepted the U.S. manifesto on the elimination of arms aid to Afghan Mujahedeen. 86 Both countries
did not officially acknowledge their intentions in public because they would not be able to justify the
position. Pakistan had heavily invested in Afghan jihad and did not want to leave it alone until a
favorable government was in place. Pakistan wanted a Pashtun backed government which can
alleviate the refugee problem and help with the border dispute (Durand line). Pakistan’s ISI had
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helped broker the ties between General Tanai and Hikmetyar for the coup against Najibullah. 87
Pakistan also believed that by backing Hikmetyar and his militia it will extend their influence within
Afghanistan and help bring about a stable and friendly government.
Najibullah had his own reservations about the Afghan armed forces due to the general
make-up, as Pashtuns from the rural areas made up the majority. In 1988, Najibullah recruited an
Uzbek militia (Jawzjani) led by Abdul Rashid Dostam. 88 The reason for the recruitment was the
earlier successes of the militia against Mujahedeen groups in Eastern Afghanistan. Najibullah could
not keep Dostam happy with large stipends as he wanted more power for the minority Uzbek
groups. The government did not want an antithesis to the central power which was primarily
preserved by Najibullah thus shunned the idea of more autonomy to Uzbek militia. Dostam had a
vision of an autonomous Northern Afghanistan which became a pressing issue. The question of
more power and autonomy proved to be a critical juncture for the government as Dostam switched
alliances and joined the Tajik commander Ahmed Shah Massoud. Dostam gave a brief statement to
justify his resolve in leaving the government as follows:
“Najibullah humiliated us and violated the rights of minorities.” 89
After the defection of Dostam, Mazar-i-Shariff fell quickly to the Mujahedeen forces. By
March 1992, the tide had turned against the Najibullah government and the Afghan armed forces.
The leadership of Parcham and Khalq factions that made up the government abruptly disintegrated.
They were quick to pick sides amongst Mujahedeen groups and again the divisions were clearly
defined by ethnicity and class. The Khalqis aligned themselves with Pashtun dominated Hizb-i
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Islami of Gulbuddin Hikmetyar. The Perchamis aligned themselves with the Tajik leader Ahmad
Shah Massoud, Uzbek leader in the north Rashid Dostam and Islamic Jamiat-i-Islami led by Dr.
Burhanuddin Rabbani. Najibullah sought a compromise with Ahmad Shah Massoud with the help of
United Nations country director Benon Sevan. The deal fell through due to lack of enthusiasm from
Massoud as he formulated that Kabul was destined to fall soon. Najibullah had to take refuge in the
United Nations compound after a failed attempt to leave the country through Kabul International
Airport which was blocked by his own mutinous armed forces. 90 Once the leadership in Kabul had
dissolved by April 1992, the immediate goal for Mujahedeen became the capture of the capital city.
The second facet within the chronological order was the lack of cooperation between various
Mujahedeen groups in choosing their leader collectively. After much debate and consultations the
Peshawar Shura (council) appointed Sibghatullah Mojaddidi as the temporary head of state who
would eventually transfer all powers to Dr. Burhanuddin Rabbani after the allotted two month rule.
This was not appreciated by all members of the Shura or the various Mujahedeen groups. The
Pashtu majority within the country did not want to see Dr. Burhanuddin Rabbani to be in charge of
the country as he was a Tajik. Ethnicity played an important role for the continued fighting amongst
the Mujahedeen groups as Hikmetyar rejected the idea outright for Rabbani to be the President of
Afghanistan.
The third facet came along in the chronological order as Hikmetyar and others were
advancing towards Kabul from various directions. Massoud and Dostam had captured the Kabul
International Airport and had stopped for the decision of the Shura in Peshawar. In the south
Hikmetyar and his militia were eager to take on Kabul and solidify Afghanistan and its rule under
Hizb-i-Islami. Hikmetyar joined forces with the local government and started advancing as it
rejected the selection of Sibghatullah Mojaddidi as the interim President of Afghanistan. On April 26
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the combined forces of Hikmetyar and local government were defeated by Ahmad Shah Massoud
thus giving way for the interim government to successively perform its duties. The interim
government was sporadically attacked in Kabul by Hikmetyar and his militia for the next four
years. 91 In these attacks the infrastructure of Kabul was completely destroyed and new wave of
refugees started to trickle into Pakistan. There was a ceasefire in August 1992, but the intermittent
fighting kept prevailing until civil war broke out in December 1992, when Rabbani was elected
President.
Afghanistan was divided in two expansive factions by the end of Najibullah government.
First faction was led by Rabbani which had the combined support from Tajik and Uzbek minorities
along with Perchamis. The second was led by Hikmetyar which was predominately Pashtun with the
support of Khalqis. The foreign actors aggravated this situation by supporting the one that was close
to their ideological and ethnic grounds. Pakistan and Saudi Arabia supported Hikmetyar because of
his Pashtun ethnicity and Sunni ideology. Iran started supporting the new government of
Burhanuddin Rabbani as it supported the minority Shi’a groups in the west. Iran also did not want a
Sunni government in Afghanistan as it perceived that to be dangerous for its own national interests.
For the first time in 300 years, Afghanistan had a non-Pashtun leader in Burhanuddin
Rabbani. 92 He moved quickly after he was selected by a council which he appointed to reconcile
differences with Hikmetyar and his militia. The Hikmetyar militia was pounding Kabul with artillery
and sporadic fighting but was unable to capture the capital city. A cease fire agreement was
formulated by Pakistan in March of 1993 between the Rabbani government and Hikmetyar. 93 Under
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the Islamabad Agreement Hikmetyar became the prime minister while Rabbani kept his post as the
President. The agreement totally ignored Ahmad Shah Massoud who was a staunch adversary of
Hikmetyar. 94 Massoud did continue to support the Rabbani government as an ‘informal’ defense
minister thus keeping some of his power base in place. The peace did not last long and in 1994 the
coalition government disintegrated and civil war broke out.
The divisions based on ethnic grounds were exploited by local Afghan leaders who played
one side against the other for bribes and favors from both parties. The central government of
Burhanuddin Rabbani played a very limited role outside of Kabul and relied heavily on regional
shuras (council). Once the shuras had power which was recognized by the central government they
were able to collect taxes, build up local militia, and collect custom duties. 95 This gave the regional
government more autonomy over its affairs and kept the central government out. Local leaders also
‘withheld’ funds from the central government thus exploiting the central government of revenues. 96
Due to the unstable state of affairs in Kabul the local leaders seized formal control over its populace.
This gave rise to anarchy within the state and Afghans were being displaced both internally and
externally (Pakistan). Due to population exodus from local villages and cities apart from Kabul the
local economy and politics never had a change for recovery. This era also ‘marked the return of
feudalism and warlordism’ which led to the total collapse of order, economics, and political
stability. 97
Lastly, Afghanistan under the Mujahedeen could only be described as, ‘chaotic.’ This will
rein in the fourth chronological order that will see an increase in instability and the displacement of
students from their religious institutions. The constant fighting between the pro and anti94
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government forces led to the total breakdown of order on social, political, and economic grounds.
The central government of Rabbani (predominantly Tajik) controlled Kabul and its surrounding
north east sections. Three provinces in the west including the city of Heart were in control of Shi’a
leader Ismail Khan who was supported by Iran. 98 The Shura (council) of Mujahedeen commanders
based in Jalalabad controlled three Pashtun dominated provinces bordering Pakistan. 99 In the south
and East of Kabul lay Hikmetyar and his militia who were pounding Kabul with artillery and
sporadic fighting against the central government. 100 The Hazaras controlled the province of Bamiyan
located in central Afghanistan. 101 General Dostam (Uzbek) laid control to six provinces in the north
and in 1994 aligned himself with Hikmetyar to attack Kabul. 102 Major City of Kandahar was divided
between dozens of ex-Mujahedeen warlords’ and various factions of bandits who plundered and
pillaged the population at will. 103 The tribal and village structures were in ruins and regional actors
like Pakistan were unwilling to deal with Durrani Pashtuns to formulate a consensus on leadership.
The warlords were in total control as they seized property from the local populace at will and
handed them to their supporters. According to Ahmad Rashid,
“the commanders abused the population at will, kidnapping young girls and boys for their sexual
pleasure, robbing merchants in the bazaars and fighting and brawling in the streets.” 104
The refugees were on the move again but instead of returning from Pakistan and Iran, a new
wave was leaving Kandahar for Quetta. 105 Many Mujahedeens, who had fought against the

98

Rashid, Ahmed. Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia. New Haven: Yale University Press,
2000. 21. Print.
99
Ibid; 2000. 21. Print.
100
Ibid; 2000. 21. Print.
101
Ibid; 2000. 21. Print.
102
Ibid; 2000. 21. Print.
103
Ibid; 2000. 21. Print.
104
Ibid; 2000. 21. Print.
105
Tanner, Fred, and Stephen J. Stedman. Refugee Manipulation War, Politics, and the Abuse of Human Suffering. New York:
Brookings Institution, 2003. 81. Print.

Najibullah government, had gone back to their madrassas in Kandahar and Quetta to continue their
education. Students’ education was interrupted by the refugees as the madrassas became the first line
of humanitarian aid to the fleeing populace. The students were given an indefinite ‘leave of absence’
from the madrassas and no date for return to continue their education. Many older students left for
their hometowns in Afghanistan while the young Afghans remained in Pakistan to help with the
refugees.
The young Afghans hardly knew about Afghanistan as they were born in Pakistan and
educated in the Pakistani madrassas. Various Mujahedeen parties trained Afghan youths on guerilla
fighting skills that will be essential in their militaristic ambitions later. Furthermore, Afghan youth
learned about the idealist, almost utopian society that was created by the Prophet Mohammad 1400
years ago through their curriculum in the madrassas. The young Afghans wanted to reproduce this
social and political order within Afghanistan and thus ignored the local histories and traditions. The
students were tired of chaos, warlordism, and corrupt Mujahedeen groups which were not only
hampering their education but also devastating their own people. According to Mullah Hassan
(Taliban leader):
“Mullahs Omar, Ghaus, and Mohammad Rabbani (no relations to President Rabbani) all knew
each other very well because we were all from Urozgan province and had fought together (against
Najibullah). Whenever we got together we would discuss the terrible plight of our people under these
bandits. We were people of the same opinions and we got on with each other very well, so it was easy
to come to a decision to do something.” 106
Various groups of Mujahedeens were also discussing the grave situation in the Pashtun
dominated region (Kandahar) and wanted some sort of a calculated action. A consortium was held
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in Kandahar (1994), which included many members who would take leading position in the Taliban
movement. They came together to discuss what can and should be done to bring about the end of
feudalism and warlordism. In this grand meeting members inked out the Taliban credo which had
three principles:
1. Restore peace in the region (through Islam or coercive means)
2. Neutralize the population by disarming
3. Impose Sharia law as the ordering principle to defend veracity and preserve the Islamic
character of Afghanistan. 107
Most of the gatherers were either full or part time students at madrassas in Afghanistan or
Pakistan and they chose a simple name to explain their ideology as well as its principles. The chosen
name was ‘Taliban.’ The gathering also created a Taliban Shura (council) who would see to the
enforcement of these principles. The joint session also nominated Mullah Omar as Amir ul
Momineen (leader of the faithful). The Taliban movement was not limited to Pashtun ethnicity as it
had leaders within its organization representing various minority groups. They undermine the
importance of ethnicity and filled that vacuum with Islamic principles which sought unity within the
Muslim ummah (community). Although the Taliban did not have much material or monetary
support outside the gathering, they had ambitions to grow into a governing outfit that will restore
order in Afghanistan. The foundation had been laid by the Taliban Shura and now it was up to them
to mobilize and take control of Afghanistan.
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